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STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CECIL A. DICKSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9343 
On 17 May 1960 the appellant, Cecil A. Dick-
son, was convicted by jury trial of the crime of rob-
bery under the provisions of 7 6-51-1, U. C. A. 19 53. 
The long resume of facts presented by the appellant 
in his brief is adequate to apprise the reader of the 
summary of evidence presented, but somewhat exces-
sive to the issues of error raised on appeal in the brief. 
A more detailed examination of the specific por-
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2 
tions of the trial, relevant to the Issues before the 
Court, is felt necessary. 
A more detailed examination of the specific por-
tions of the trial relevant to the issues before the Cou~t 
is felt necessary. 
The appellant raised the issue of alibi at his trial. 
In support of his contention, deposition testimony of 
several witnesses was introduced and presented to the 
jury (R. 148). For all but one witness the state pre-
sented cross interrogatories to the questions asked by 
the accused. It was stipulated that the questions to 
each deponent were put and answered under oath (R. 
149). Rose Vaile, the appellant's mother, was the 
first deposition witness. Her general testimony on di-
rect examination was in support of the appellant's 
contention of alibi. On cross examination the District 
Attorney posed the following question and received 
the following answer: 
''Q. Do you understand that you are 
under oath and that any answers you give 
which are not true could subject you to a crim-
inal charge of per jury? 
"A. Yes" (R. 152). 
The appellant's brother also testified by way of 
deposition, and on cross examination the same se-
quence of question and answer was had as to his aware-
ness of possible criminal charges for perjury as is set 
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out above (R. 157). In addition to a question con-
cerning what, if anything, was said between he and 
appellant's attorney, the following answer was elicited 
(R. 157-8). 
"Q. What was said and by whom? 
HA. He just asked us about this, and we 
answered them. He told us that we knew that 
we would be under oath or something like that, 
and told us whatever we did to tell the truth." 
The appellant's sister-in-la\v also acknowledged 
that she was under oath and subject to perjury (R. 
160). The same indication was obtained by cross in-
terrogatory from the accused's sister (R. 165). Only 
the ex-wife of the accused did not affirmatively indi-
cate an awareness of possible perjury charges for false 
testimony by deposition (R. 168). This apparently 
was because the District Attorney posed no cross in-
terrogatories. However, a clear stipulation was before 
the jury that all deponents were under oath (R. 149). 
With reference to the District Attorney's argu-
ment to the jury concerning deposition testimony, it 
does not appear of record specifically what was said; 
apparently the comment was raised on rebuttal argu-
ment (R. 24 7). However, the Court specifically al-
lowed the accused's counsel the right of additional 
rebuttal to the argument (R. 247). 
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Accused's counsel requested an instruction be 
given to the jury to the effect that witnesses giving 
testimony by interrgoatory are subject to the penalties 
of perjury (R. 249). The Court indicated in writing 
on the proposed instruction that it was to be given in 
substance (R. 23). The Court thereafter instructed 
the jury without specific deference to witnesses who 
appeared in person or by deposition, but instructed 
the jury that, as to which, if any, witness they were 
to believe, and what weight to be given thereto is a 
matter of their determination (R. 43-45). The 
Court's failure to give the exact requested instruction 
is claimed to be prejudicial error. 
The accused took the stand to testify in his own 
behalf. After testifying on direct examination he was 
subjected to cross examination by the District Attor-
ney. The relevant part of this cross examination is 
set out below: 
''Q. And you were in prison for robbery 
weren't you? 
"A. Yes sir. 
''Q. And that was on two counts, 
wasn't it? 
''A. I believe so. 
"Mr. King: Mr. Banks, you may ask how 
many convictions there were I believe. 
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"Mr. Banks: I am using this for the pur-
pose of modus operandi, Your Honor. 
''The Court: I think he can tell-you 
could go into the type of conviction, how many 
convictions there were. I think he may answer 
if there were two counts. 
* * * 
''A. Yes, two counts. 
"Q. And that was two separate robber-
ies? 
"A. Yes, sir, but they were all right in 
the same-
"Q. Same area of time? 
"A. About the same, yes. 
"Q. But they were two different robber-
ies? 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. And both of those happened to be 
food markets too, didn't they? 
"A. No, sir. They were liquor stores" 
(R. 211-212). 
This last testimony was all unobjected to. Counsel's 
objection, if such it was, was directed to requesting the 
District Attorney to ask the number of convictions. 
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The testimony as to time and liquor stores was vol-
unteered by the accused. 
The District Attorney then went on to question 
the accused about an incident that happened subse-
quent to the charge he faced at the instant trial (R. 
213). The incident concerned a fracas in which the 
accused participated with his brother, and was charged 
with being an accessory to attempted robbery (R. 
218). Whether this incident resulted in a conviction 
is unclear. The incident was brought out over objec-
tion by the accused's counsel (R. 214) although on 
recross the accused's counsel made additional inquiry 
concerning the incident (R. 219). It appeared that 
this incident was in association with the accused's 
brother. The prosecution's evidence in the instant case 
inferred that the crime with which the accused was 
charged was also so carried out. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 2, 4.) The trial judge instructed the jury that 
the evidence of other crimes committed by the accused 
could not be considered as evidence that he committed 
the crime with which he was now charged, but that it 
could be considered only as to what weight to give to 
the testimony of the defendant himself (R. 46). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COM-
MIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN NOT GIV-
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ING THE INSTRUCTION REQUESTED 
BY THE ACCUSED THAT PERSONS WHO 
TESTIFIED FALSELY COULD BE 
CHARGED WITH PERJURY. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COM-
MIT ERROR IN RECEIVING EVIDENCE 
OF PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS OF THE 
ACCUSED NOR IN RECEIVING TESTI-
MONY SURROUNDING THE CONVIC-
TION. 
POINT Ill. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR 
IN RECEIVING EVIDENCE OF OTHER 
MISCONDUCT OF THE ACCUSED NOT 
RESULTING IN CONVICTION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COM-
MIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN NOT GIV-
ING THE INSTRUCTION REQUESTED 
BY THE ACCUSED THAT PERSONS WHO 
TESTIFIED FALSELY COULD BE 
CHARGED WITH PERJURY. 
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There is no requirement that a court give every 
instruction proposed by a party. If the instructions 
given adequately appraise the jury of the law, the de-
fendant may not command that the instructions be 
given in the words proposed by him. State v. Camp-
bell, 116Utah74,208P.2d530 (1949). Itissuf-
ficient if from all the instructions, when read as a 
whole, the jury is clearly appraised of the law that it 
must apply. Wilson v. Gardner, 10 Utah 2d 89, 348 
P. 2d 931; State v. Cox, 106 Utah 253, 147 P. 2d 
858 ( 1944). Nor is there any requirement that a 
court give an instruction that would mislead the jury, 
be unnecessary, or which is erroneous. State v. Erwin, 
101 Utah 365, 120 P. 2d 285 (1942). Nor is it 
error to refuse a requested instruction if the matters 
are necessarily encompassed in other instructions. 
State v. 1-Iougensen, 91 Utah 351, 64 P. 2d 229 
( 193 7). Error in the instant case can only be claimed 
if the proposed instruction, proffered by the accused, 
was applicable and correct, and if the Court had a 
duty to so instruct and did not otherwise adequately 
cover the tendered matter. U. S. v. Hancey, 108 F. 
2d 835 (C. C. A. Utah 1940). 
An analysis of the facts of the instant case and 
the proposed instruction make it clear that there has 
been no error. The appellant contends that since the 
testimony of some of the witnesses was by deposition, 
and that since the prosecutor inferred they were lying 
that unless the proposed instruction was given the jury 
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may be mislead into believing that the testimony of 
deposition witnesses is not of the same weight as that 
of witnesses that appear in person. It should be noted 
first that counsel did not make any request for instruc-
tions relative to deposition testimony per se, but merely 
requested that the jury be informed that all witnesses, 
both those present in person and by deposition, are 
subject to perjury charges for knowingly giving false 
testimony. It is submitted first that such an instruc-
tion is irrelevant and without merit, and since there 
is no requirement that irrelevant or unmeritorious in-
structions be givel?-, no error \vas committed. State v. 
Erwin, supra. 
The essential requirement to a witnesses' testi-
mony is not that a witness be under legal compulsion 
to speak truthfully, but that the witness have knowl-
edge of the need to tell the truth and recognize the 
necessity for doing so. The fact that a statute exists 
making it a crime to give false testimony is of no mat-
ter to the jury, what is essential is that they know that 
a witness feels compulsion to tell the truth. In the 
instant case the proposed instruction was merely an 
incomplete paraphrasing of the penal definition of 
perjury, 76-45-1, U. C. A. 1953. It would be no more 
relevant than an instruction on what constituted the 
law of perjury. The crime of perjury was not before 
the jury nor was there any evidence that perjury had 
been committed. Instructions should only concern the 
crime charged and not others not before the court. 
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Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, § 668. Therefore, the 
instruction was not geared to the evidence, was not 
relevant, nor could it properly effect the juries' delib~ 
erations. Instructions not adjusted to the evidence or 
which are irrelevant are not proper. Draine v. State, 
89 S. E. 2d 182, 2116a 801; People v. Liss, 35 Cal. 
2d 570, 219 P. 2d 789. The jury already had before 
them the testimony of all but one of the witnesses in~ 
dicating that they understood and believed they could 
be charged with perjury for wilfully giving false tes-
timony. The specific admission of belief which evi-
dences a motive to tell the truth is what is essential; 
giving the jury an abstract statement of criminal law 
could in no way be relevant to the charge or add to 
the information before the jury as to the weight to be 
given the testimony. After a witness had admitted he 
believed he could be punished, which is the essential 
element of credibility of a witness, McCormick, Evi-
dence, p. 139, et seq., an instruction that the criminal 
law imposed sanctions would be immaterial. It would 
not be material to any evidence before the Court, nor 
material to effect the credibility or weight to be given 
such tstimony. The correct instruction to have been 
requested would have been one that deposition testi~ 
mony is entitled to the same consideration, the same 
rebuttable presumption that the witness speaks the 
truth, and same judgment on the part of the juror 
with reference to its weight. Such an instruction was 
not requested, and is a far cry from the immaterial 
requesct made by counsel for the accused. 
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Under the circumstances of this case, it appearing 
that the requested instruction was not material to any 
issue before the jury, and was merely a statement of 
penal law not then being considered by the Court, it 
was not error to deny to give the same. State v. Phil-
lips, 136 Kan. 407, 15 P. 2d 408. It is said that in-
structions must include two principal groups: ( 1) 
those stating the substantive law of the case, and ( 2) 
those relating to the rules for weighing evidence. Since 
the requested instruction fits neither of these categories 
it was not error to refuse it. Abbott, ·Criminal Trial 
Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 673. 
It is generally recognized that the court has power 
to modify and conform the instruction to its own view 
of the law. Abbott, op. cit., p. 1249. In the instant 
case, as evidenced by the trial judge's notation on the 
proposed instruction, the correct instruction concern-
ing the weight to be accorded the testimony was given. 
(Instructions 7, 8 and 9. R. 44-45.) There is no 
question but that these instructions were correct. They 
properly apprised the jury of their duty to consider 
the testimony of all witnesses. In construing these 
instructions as a whole they adequately supplied the 
jury with the correct principal to be applied in weigh-
ing the evidence. As the instruction proposed would 
have added nothing, the instruction given adequately 
corrected the situation and sufficed. 
Finally it cannot be contended that the accused 
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was prejudiced by any failure to give the instruction as 
requested. The jury had before them the testimony of 
the witnesses themselves that they believed they could 
be punished for perjury if they knowingly gave false 
testimony, and the accused's counsel was afforded ad-
ditional time to argue against any inference that the 
District Attorney may have made concerning the depo-
sition testimony. As such it cannot be claimed that 
the failure to give the instruction in any way preju-
diced the accused or left the jury without a sufficient 
guide to weigh the evidence. 
From this it must be concluded that no prejudi-
cial error was made by the trial court concerning the 
charge to the jury. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COM-
MIT ERROR IN RECEIVING EVIDENCE 
OF PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS OF THE 
ACCUSED NOR IN RECEIVING TESTI-
MONY SURROUNDING THE CONVIC-
TION. 
It is a generally recognized principal of law that 
an accused testifying on his own behalf may be im-
peached like any other witness by proving that he has 
been convicted of a felony. State v. Thorne, 39 Utah 
208, 117 Pac. 58; 77-44-6, U. C. A. 1953. There 
is no question then, but that the examination of the 
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accused Dickson concerning a previous conviction for 
robbery is proper for impeachment purposes. There 
is no question but that the examiner may ask about 
the name of the crime committed, State v. Crawford~ 
60 Utah 6, 206 Pac. 717 ( 1922), and the punish-
ment awarded, McCormick, Evidence, Sec. 43. As to 
how far in addition an examiner may proceed is not 
clear. Certainly if he goes forward without specific 
objection by counsel no error may be claimed. Wig-
more, Evidence~ § 18. In the instant case counsel was 
hardly lucid in his objection to inquiry into the facts 
of the accused's past convictions. The record merely 
reflects a statement from counsel addressed to the pros-
ecutor concerning inquiry into the number of convic-
tions. His failure to object to the prosecutor's question 
concerning details of the crime may well act as a 
waiver. McCormick, Evidence~ Ch. 6. It must be 
noted that the trial judge said nothing concerning the 
prosecutor's right to enter into the details of the crime, 
and presumably from the Court's statement nothing 
would prevent the defense counsel from then objecting. 
Counsel's failure to do so must be deemed a wa1ver, 
and he cannot now claim error on appeal. 
Even so the inquiry, based on the representation 
of the prosecutor that it was to go to modus operandi 
was proper. Evidence and facts of a specific crime may 
be introduced for the purpose of showing plan or 
scheme. The modus operandi of a robber is of rele-
vance to show that the accused in the past has also 
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used such a plan or scheme to effect his illegal means. 
People v. Peete, 28 Cal. 2d 306, 169 P. 2d 924. 
In the instant case the prosecutor possibly did 
not go far enough to clearly demonstrate the full effect 
of the principal of modus operandi; however, what 
he did elicit was relevant. He did demonstrate a close 
relationship to the instant crime. It was shown that 
other retail type business establishments had been the 
subject of the accused's criminal intentions, and that 
his operations were in close proximiity of time to each 
other. All of these factors were relevant to the mode 
of commission of the instant crime. It must be re-
membered that the modern criminal does all he can to 
disguise his actions and avoid detection; therefore, the 
requirement that a scheme be a full reflection of past 
conduct is ridiculous. With specific reference to the 
personalities and intelligence of white male criminals 
convicted of robbery, see 49 Journal of Criminal Law, 
Criminology and Police Science 412. It is enough 
that the evidence reasonably tends to connect the ac-
cused to the crime charged. State V. Scott, Ill Utah 
9, 175 P. 2d 1016; State v. Nemier, 106 Utah 307, 
148 P. 2d 327. As was said in State v. Neal, 123 
Utah 93, 254 P. 2d I 053 ( 1953), with reference to 
the rule in Utah: 
H* * * the state may not prove other 
offenses where the sole and only purpose of such 
proof is to show defendant's propensity to com-
mit crime because the jury is apt to give such 
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evidence undue weight, but such evidence is ad-
missible when offered for the purpose of show-
ing an intention or design to or a motive for 
commission of the offense charged. In other 
words, the rule as stated in the N emier case and 
more clearly by Mr. Chief Justice Wolfe in the 
Scott case, supra, is that evidence of other of-
fenses is excluded only where the sole purpose is 
to show defendant's propensity for the commis-
sion of crime and does not include cases where 
the purpose of such evidence is to show defen-
dant's intention or design to or motive for com-
mission of the crime charged." 
Hence in the instant case it was not error to allow the 
prosecutor to proceed as he did. State v. Lyman, 10 
Utah 2d 58, 348 P. 2d 340. 
Finally, it cannot be said that the receipt of the 
additional information prejudiced the accused. A sub-
stantial number of cases have indicated that the record 
of the former conviction itself is admissible in evidence, 
and hence anything contained therein not directed to 
inciting the jury should be received. State . Haugen-
son, 91 Utah 351, 64 P. 2d 229; State v. Green, 167 
Wash. 266, 9 P. 2d 62; State v. Rodia, 132 N. J. L. 
199, 39 Atl. 2d 484. Since the facts, actually volun-
teered by the accused in the instant case, would have 
been shown had the record itself been introduced, no 
claim of prejudice should be had. In addition in the 
instant case the only factor not clearly admissible even 
if a very narrow approach is taken would be the type 
of store involved. This was volunteered by the ac-
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cused in the instant case, and even so did not hurt his 
position since it diluted the more specific connection 
the prosecutor had tried to demonstrate. As a conse-
quence it is equally as inferable that he was helped by 
it as hindered. The appellant's claim of error on this 
point is, therefore, not well taken. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR 
IN RECEIVING EVIDENCE OF OTHER 
MISCONDUCT OF THE ACCUSED NOT 
RESULTING IN CONVICTION. 
Appellant contend sthat the trial court erred in 
allowing examination of the accused, by the District 
Attorney, into the incident in Fort Worth, Texas, 
that resulted in the accused being charged as an acces-
sory after the fact to the crime of robbery. The ob-
jection to such testimony was that it was immaterial; 
this objection was overruled by the trial court, and 
after an unrecorded conference the prosecution was 
allowed to proceed with the examination. The evi-
dence disclosed that on April 5, 19 59, subsequent in 
time, but closely related to, the offense involved in the 
instant action, the accused, in the company of his 
brother, parked near a store, in Fort Worth, Texas; 
thereafter the accused's brother went to a telephone 
booth, and as the store owner came to the store the 
accused's brother went up to him. A struggle resulted 
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and the accused and his brother were shot by the store 
owner. The accused assisted his brother in making his 
get away. The accused's brother was charged with 
attempted robbery and the accused with being an ac-
cessory ( R. 213-2 2 0) . 
The evidence was admissible on two bases. ( 1) 
It was evidence properly admissible to impeach the 
witness since it demonstrated misconduct on the part 
of the accused even though not resulting in a convic-
tion. Wigmore, Evidence, § § 983, 986. (2) The 
evidence was admissible to show the scheme or design 
regularly employed by the accused in carrying out 
criminal activities. State v. Lyman, 10 U. 2d 58, 348 
P. 2d 340. 
The general rule of evidence relating to the first 
point is stated in McCormick, Evidence, p. 87: 
''The English common law tradition of 
'cross-examination to credit', permits the coun-
sel to inquire into the associations and personal 
history of the witness, including any particular 
misconduct which would tend to discredit his 
character, though not the subject of conviction 
for crime.'' 
Thus, in People v. Sorge, 301 N. Y. 198, 93 N. 
E. 2d 63 7 ( 19 50), it was held in a prosecution for 
abortion to be within the sound discretion of the trial 
judge to allow, by way of cross-examination, inquiry 
into other abortions committed by the accused. 
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In State v. Neal, 222 N. C. 546, 23 S. E. 2d 911 
( 194 3), it was said that inquiry into other miscon-
duct not amounting to conviction, viz a viz, larceny, 
assault, vagrancy, was permissible where the accused 
was charged with murder. 
The matter is usually committed to the sound 
discretion of the trial judge, McCormick, supra, p. 87. 
In the instant case the trial judge gave consideration to 
the objections of the accused, and then ruled to allow 
the evidence. The accused did not deny the matter, 
but in fact enlarged upon the questions put by the 
prosecution. Counsel for the accused on redirect took 
it upon himself to expand the scope of inquiry and to 
explain away any impropriety. Under these circum-
stances it cannot be said that the Court abused its dis-
cretion. The rule in Utah has been recognized in the 
past. State v. Neal, 123 Utah 93, 254 P. 2d 1053 
( 1953). The only apparent limitations are those nor-
mally placed upon claimed irrelevant or immaterial 
testimony. The testimony of the vvitness ·was relevant 
to his credibility. The misconduct shown or examined 
into was such as to cast doubt upon the testimonial 
worth of the accused. Wigmore, supra, Section 981. 
The incident was closely related in time to the instant 
charge, and finally the accused was given full latitude 
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to rebut. Under these circumstances the trial judge did 
not abuse his discretion and the testimony was proper 
for impeachment. 
The evidence was also admissible to show modus 
operandi. The evidence of the subsequent misconduct 
fits into the criminal pattern characterized by the activ-
ities of the instant case. As such the evidence was ad-
missible to show a scheme or design. State v. Neat 
supra; State v. Lyman, supra. 
The evidence disclosed a similar pattern of opera-
tion between the misconduct in Fort Worth and that 
with which tl?e accused was charged in Salt Lake. The 
actions show joint activity with the accused's brother; 
it demonstrates the use of the automobile as a get-away 
device, and finally the subject of the robbery being a 
retail grocery was the same. These facts were offered 
not to show the tendency of the accused for crime in 
general, but with direct relationship to the crime 
charged and hence were properly before the jury. State 
V. Neal, supra. 
As was said in State v. Neal.. supra, at page 100 
U tab Reports: 
''It was not error to permit the District 
Attorney to cross-examine defendant as to other 
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offenses. Over defendant's objection the Dis-
trict Attorney asked him if he committed four 
robberies in California, giving the time and 
place of each. * * * 
• 'Of course, if this questioning stood alone 
and was made in bad faith without the District 
Attorney having reason to believe his guilty of" 
such offenses, such procedure would be highly 
improper and the case should be reversed. But 
the evidence does not show that such was the 
case. * * *" 
Nor does the evidence in the instant case show any ill-
will or bad faith on the part of the prosecutor. Evi-
dence as elicited was dead y relevant, and tends to show 
the District Attorney acted justifiably. Under these 
circumstances the receipt of the evidence was not error. 
Nor could the receipt of the evidence be said to be 
prejudiciaL The accused's counsel adopted the matter 
on redirect and the accused was allowed to explain his 
version to the jury without contradiction. In addition, 
the jury was instructed that the accused's testimony 
was to be weighed in the same fashion as any other 
witness; under such circumstances the accused was not 
prejudiced. 
CONCLUSION 
The accused was given a full and fair hearing on 
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the charges against him. A jury after hearing and 
weighing the evidence against him and on his behalf 
adjudged him guilty. An analysis of the errors raised 
on appeal show them to be without merit; as such the 
Court should affirm the jury's decision. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Attorney General, 
RONALD N. BOYCE, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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